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Abstract  
 
In Islamic finance, the use of derivatives seems to be in dispute among the scholars despites 
its prominent emergence in the market. Majority of scholars object the use of derivatives on 
the basis that it contains the element of gharar. The Jeddah Fiqh of Academy rules that 
options are objectionable for they could not infer options in the world today with any of the 
Shariah nominated options contracts. Nevertheless, some scholars argue the validity of this 
instrument based on the concept of khiyar-al-shart and drew parallel with the concept of bai-
al urbun. This study investigates warrants pricing of 73 Malaysian warrants traded within the 
six year period by employing the BSOPM. There seems to be deviations of pricing where 
96% (70 out of 73) of the warrants traded are mispriced in reference with their theoretical 
values. This mispricing of warrants indicated inefficiency in the Malaysian warrants market. 
Therefore, based on the argument above and the extent of mispricing revealed in the analysis, 
this study found the element of gharar in warrants contract when viewed from the pricing 
inefficiency in the market. Mispricing of warrants in Malaysian market indicates speculative 
activities and speculation is not allowed in Islam. Speculation may contain gharar 
(uncertainty) and maysir (gambling) which are all prohibited in Islam. Islam forbids these 
because they may result in wealth accumulation at the expense of other parties. This activity 
violates the concept of adl (justice), does not serve the concept of maslahah (public interest) 
and does not follow the maqasid al Shariah.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The presence of risk is inevitable in the business world. Two types of risks are recognizable 
which are business risk and financial risk. When talking about financial risk we are actually 
dealing with the uncertainty of interest rates, exchange rates, stock prices, and commodity 
prices. The tools needed in dealing with financial risks are called derivatives. Derivatives, 
financial instruments whose returns are derived from those of other financial instruments, act 
as a mean to transfer any undesired risk to other parties who, for a price, are willing to 
assume that risk. Some risk management products developed in Malaysia are futures, 
forward, options and swap. One most active and popular derivative under option is warrants 
which can be categorized as equity warrants and call warrants. Equity warrants are 
derivatives of a share, an option which “gives the holder the right to subscribe for a given 
number of ordinary shares with the conversion ratio of 1 to 1 in the company at a 
predetermined exercise price within a specified time period” (Haron, 2006 pp.7). 
Derivatives are financial asset dependent on the value of its underlying asset. Being 
so, from the Islamic perspective, the sale of the underlying asset must adhere to the Shariah 
principles for it to be permissible. The underlying assets must not involve in prohibited core 
activities like financial services based on riba (interest), maisir (gambling) and gaming, 
manufacturing or selling of non-halal products or related products, any activities containing 
an element of gharar (uncertainty) like conventional insurance, entertainment activities 
which are non-permissible according to Shariah, manufacturing or selling of tobacco-based 
products or related products, stockbroking or share trading in non-Shariah compliant 
securities and other activities that are not in harmony with the Shariah principles (Securities 
Commission of Malaysia). Not just that they must be Shariah compliance, the underlying 
assets must currently exist in their physical, sellable form and the seller should have legal 
ownership of the asset in its final form (Obaidullah, 1999). 
Nevertheless, regardless of its prominent emergence in the market, derivatives, in this 
case, the use of warrants, receive disputing arguments from the Islamic scholars worldwide. 
The fiqh al-muamalat (Islamic jurisprudence) asserts that financial contracts must satisfy a 
number of requirements, which are lacking in the use and trading of conventional derivatives. 
Literature witnesses several prominent views by the scholars in evaluating the permissibility 
of this financial instrument. The validity of warrant/option is done under the concept of al-
khiyar (options) and also by drawing parallel between options and bai-al-urbun (deposit).  
On the other hand, warrants/options are accused of having the element of gharar 
(uncertainty) and are transacted for speculative gains (Obaidullah, 2002) thus is not 
favourable to certain scholars. The Jeddah Fiqh Academy in its Seventh Session in Jeddah, 
Saudi Arabia in 1992 has ruled in the Resolution no: 63/1/7, that 
 
“Options contract as currently applied in the world financial market are a new type 
of contracts which do not come under any of the Shariah nominated contracts. Since the 
object of the contract is neither a sum of money nor a utility or a financial right which may 
be waived, then the contract is not permissible in Shariah. As these contracs are primarily 
prohibited, their handling is also prohibited”. 
 
 Abu Sulayman (1992) of the Jeddah Fiqh Academy views warrants/options as being 
totally detached from the underlying asset, therefore unacceptable.  
 Therefore, in the light of the above contrasting arguments and opinions, this study 
aims to investigate the non-permissibility of warrants on the basis of gharar and that warrants 
are transacted for speculative gains (Obaidullah, 2002). This study will examine the existence 
of gharar element in warrants pricing especially in the case of mispricing through the 
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informational efficient market perspective. The Black Scholes Option Pricing Model 
(BSOPM), a robust set of methods, is used to analyze the pricing efficiency of warrants 
market and to detect any mispricing in warrants contracts in Malaysia. Then the mispricing 
detected will be analyzed with regards to the issue of gharar in order to determine the status 
of warrants from the Shariah perspective.   
The rest of this study is organized as follows. Next is the literature review covering 
past studies on warrants mispricing and the status of warrants/options from the Islamic 
perspective. Later follows by the methodology of BSOPM employed in determining the 
existence of mispricing in warrants. The fourth section discusses and analyses the finding in 
relation to the issue of gharar and the final section concludes the whole study.   
 
2. Literature Review  
 
2.1 Warrants and Warrants Mispricing 
 
Warrants essentially are an embedded option, where it has features like an option. So, equity 
warrants can be put into the family of call option. However, there are some criteria that make 
option and warrants differ in nature. In the event of exercising the warrants, the issuing 
company satisfies the exercise by delivering new shares to the warrants holder. As the 
consequence, the number of shares outstanding in the company increased even though 
concurrently the assets, cash flows and other operating fundamentals remain fixed. As such, 
this event reduces the value of share price, which leads to ownership dilution. This is the 
main difference between warrants and options, even though warrants belong to the family of 
call option, the exercising of option never bring to the changes of number of shares 
outstanding and stock prices, thus there is no dilution effect. For the maturity period, warrants 
have longer maturity than options. Normally, warrants maturity in Malaysia varies from 5 to 
10 years while options have maturity of less than a year. 
When the actual market prices are similar or are only slightly different from the 
theoretical prices they are considered as fairly and efficiently priced. Macbeth and Merville 
(1979) test on the Black-Scholes on options and find that the Black-Scholes model under-
prices the in-the-money options and over prices the out-of the-money options. Kuwahara and 
Marsh (1992) follow a similar pattern when they report discrepancies between the Black-
Scholes model value of Japanese equity warrants and the observed market price, where the 
in-the-money option being under-priced. Chung et. al. (2014) investigate the efficiency of 
warrants prices based on the Taiwan warrants market data. They support Fama (1970) 
holding statement that arbitrageurs are the key factor to the efficiency of warrants market. An 
efficient market will cause an immediate and complete react to the valuable information. The 
existence of arbitrage opportunities means lack of efficiency in the market. Therefore, Chung 
et. al. (2014) concluded that the warrants market price in Taiwan is inefficient since the 
exploitable arbitrage activities existed. In a perfect market, the option and the underlying 
must simultaneously reflect new information. Byoun and Park (2009) reveal that the 
information flow between the option market and the underlying stock market in Korea may 
not be efficient as there exist significant arbitrage activities in the market.  
Most studies on warrants pricing documented mispricing in relation to the theoretical 
values computed using the BSPOM (Liu and Rangan, 2011). Nevertheless, Chan and Sy 
(1997) used the BSOPM to price Malaysian warrants and found that the model produced 
quite accurate pricing compared to the actual market prices for 9 of the 12 warrants studied. 
Haron (2006), however, found pricing deviations in warrants pricing for the trading period of 
100 days from 1 January 2004 to 31 May 2004, thus concluded that there was pricing 
inefficiency in the Malaysian warrants market. Sukor and Obiyathulla (2010) also 
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documented pricing inefficiency in the Malaysian market during January 1998 to December 
2005, in line with Haron (2006). Chang et. al. (2013) found that Chinese warrants are much 
over-priced compared with the Black-Scholes prices with historical volatility. 
 
 
2.2  Mixed Opinions on the Validity of Warrants (Options) from the Islamic 
Perspectives 
 
 2.2.1  Al-Khiyar 
 
Warrants/options are acceptable when its validity is based on the concept of al-khiyar. 
Al-Zuhayli (2003) documented a number of khiyar that provide the contracting parties the 
choice to proceed and carry on with the contract or terminate it. The parties to the contract 
must be reasonably certain and informed about the values being exchanged, and the 
implications of the contract. Any uncertainty, or the absence of relevant information, termed 
as gharar, should be carefully observed and avoided for a valid contract. Al-khiyar reduces 
gharar and makes it acceptable. Moreover, Islamic al-khiyar options have a 'reassessment' or 
'cooling-off period’ over which they can proceed or terminate the contract (Helliar & 
Alsahlawi, 2011). Fiqh literature documented several categories of khiyar. Among others are 
khiyar al-shart (stipulation condition), khiyar al-ru’yah (inspection), khiyar al-‘ayb 
(discovery of a defect) and khiyar al-ta’yin (the selection option) .Of these, khiyar al-shart is 
acknowledged as the most suitable alternative to the conventional warrants/options as 
claimed by Kamali (1997), Obaidullah (1999) and Al-Amine (2008). Khiyar al-shart (option 
of stipulation) is an option within a certain period after the agreement made by both 
contracting parties during which either parties may decide to cancel it, implying that the 
contracting parties are given some time to evaluate the benefits of the contract. The argument 
in favour of the validity of khiyar al-shart is based on an authentic hadith, 
 
A man (Hibban ibn Munqidh) complained to the Prophet (SAW) that he was a victim of 
frequent cheating in sales. The prophet advised him, “When you conclude a sale, say, there 
must be no fraud” (Sahih al-Bukahri, 1422:3:65) 
 
Corresponding to the above hadith, Al-Bayhaqi reported the following addition to it: 
 
“Then you may reserve for yourself an option lasting for three nights. If you are 
pleased, keep it; and if you are displeased, return it” (Al-Bayhaqi, 1344:5:273) 
 
However, in objection, Ahmad Muhayyuddin Hasan (1986) argues that, the maturity of 
the option contract must not exceed three days as per Khiyar-al-shart and if it is beyond three 
days it is unacceptable. Ahmad Muhayyuddin Hasan also claims option contract of being 
oppressive and unjust since the buyer of an option will benefit more than the seller. 
 
2.2.2 Bai-al-urbun 
 
Another opinion on the validity of warrants/option is based on the bai al-urbun 
concept. “A bai al-urbun contract is a predetermined sale contract that involves a penalty for 
cancellation. A bai al-urbun can be used for hedging transactions, but not for speculation, 
and protects the cost against adverse future price movements but also allows the buyer to 
benefit from forward price movements” (Helliar & Alsahlawi, 2011, pp 122). Kamali (1997) 
describes al-urbun as an earnest money which the seller takes from the buyer with the 
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understanding that it becomes part of the price in the event that the sale is ratified, but that it 
will belong to the seller in the event the buyer fails to ratify his initial agreement. In 
validating the urbun, Imam Ibn Hambal relied on the report of Nafi' ibn Harith (ra),  
 
Caliph 'Umar's officer in Makkah, that states to the effect that he bought from Safwan 
Ibn Umayyah (RA) a prison house for the Caliph 'Umar (RA) for four thousand dirhams on 
the condition that if the caliph approved of it, the deal would be final; otherwise, he (Safwan) 
will be given four hundred dirhams (that is about ten percent of the actual price as 
compensation). 
 
 In a sale of this kind, the buyer asks the seller to reserve the goods for him and agrees 
not to ask for the return of the deposit if he changes his mind. El Gari (1993) also argues in 
support of transactions in options by referring to the framework of bai al-urbun. Following 
Ibn Hanbal school of Fiqh, the argument supporting this type of sale is based on the Athar 
(practices of sahabah) which is reported in al-Bukhari from Ibn Sirin:  
 
“A man told the operator of a caravan, I would like to join your passengers, but if I did 
not depart with you on a certain day, you would be entitled to a sum of one hundred dirhams. 
When he did not depart on the set date, he willingly agreed to comply with the condition.” 
 
Contrastingly, Salehabadi and Aram (2002) when comparing an option with bai-al 
urbun, argues that option is different from bai- al urbun where an option premium is not a 
part of the selling price while bai-al urbun is a part of the selling price. The urbun (deposit) 
will be taken by the seller as compensation for terminating the sales agreement and this 
practice is prohibited by Rasulullah p.b.u.h. (Ibnu Majah Hadith). Moreover, all the schools 
of fiqh except the Hanbali School prohibit bai-al urbun (Obaidullah, 2002).  
 
2.2.3 Gharar 
 
On the ground of gharar, another standing on the non-permissibility of 
warrants/options is by Obaidullah (2002) where he stresses that the majority of the Islamic 
scholars reject the conventional warrants for they involve gharar and are transacted for 
speculative gains. Though there is no verse in the Qur’an to proscribe gharar explicitly, 
vanity (al- batil) is forbidden in many verses: 
 
“And do not eat up your property among yourselves for vanities, nor use it as bait for 
the judges” (Al-Baqarah:188). 
“O ye who believe! Eat not up your property among yourselves in vanities; but let these 
be amongst you traffic and trade by mutual good will” (An-Nisa:161). 
 
A number of Quranic interpreters agree that the word ‘vanity’ above means gharar (Al-
Saati, 2003). Al-Saati also quoted Ibn Al-Arabi’s explanation that vanity (al-batil) is 
unlawful because it is prohibited by Shariah such as usury and gharar and Zamakhshari’s 
understanding that the acts which are forbidden by Shariah are considered as vanity such as 
theft, dishonesty, gambling and gharar contracts. Having no consensus on its definition, 
gharar is said to be the result of jahl (ignorance), inadequate information and a lack of 
transparency. Therefore, on this ground, warrants are not permissible for not being in 
harmony with the Maqasid al Shariah (overall objective of Shariah principles) and obviously 
very far from the concept of adl (justice) that should prevail in all exchange contracts 
(Anwar, 1995) as emphasized in the Qur’an (An-Nisa’:29). 
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In favour of the permissibility of this financial instrument, Kamali (1995) put forward a 
firm stand that granting an option, exercising it over a period of time or charging a fee for it 
bear nothing that are objectionable. It is permissible (mubah) and Kamali claimed that it is 
simply an extension of the basic liberty that the Quran has granted.  
 
2.2.4 Shariah Advisory Council (SAC), Securities Commission of Malaysia 
 
For the case in Malaysia, the Shariah Advisory Council (SAC) of Securities 
Commission of Malaysia has announced that embedded options (call warrants and equity 
warrants) are classified as Shariah approved securities as long that the underlying assets are 
Shariah compliant (Securities Commission). The SAC has also agreed that warrants have 
fulfilled the requirement of mal (property) which have satisfied the concept of haq maliy 
(rights on assets with financial value) and haq tamalluk (ownership rights) principles. This 
resolution is following the Maliki, Shafi`i and Hanbali Mazhab and some jurists of the Hanafi 
Mazhab of the later generation whom have accepted that warrants is something that can be 
possessed and benefited from and one can transfer his rights to any one, either by getting 
money for it, or for free (Obaidullah, 2002). 
 
3. Data and Methodology  
 
This study covers the period of six years from January 2006 to December 2012 on 183 
outstanding equity warrants as at December 2012.  In order to ensure a certain level of 
liquidity, the warrants under study should be listed for at least 3 years in the market, therefore 
the warrants that start inception in 2011 and 2012 are excluded in this study. Thus, after 
considering the three years minimum listing, there are only 73 warrants were analyzed out of 
the 183 warrants. The daily closing prices of the underlying and warrants are employed 
starting from January 2006 until December 2012.  
The Black-Scholes Option Pricing Model (BSOPM) is applied in determining the 
theoretical price of warrants traded during the study period. BSOPM is originally designed to 
value options, however due to some similar characteristic in options and warrants, the 
BSOPM is widely used to measure warrants price provided with some adjustment done due 
to the dilution effects. After the theoretical warrants price is examined, this paper analyses the 
degree of mispricing in warrants. This is done by comparing the actual market price of 
warrants with the theoretical priced derived from the BSOPM. 
 
3.1 The Black-Scholes Option Pricing Model (BSOPM) 
 
The pioneers of this model, Fischer Black and Myron Scholes (1973) have developed 
the BSOPM to value option. The model is arguably one of the most elegant models in 
finance. The biggest advantage of the BSOPM is that it provides a closed-form solution to 
option pricing. The model is also suitable and practical in estimating warrants price 
(Obiyathulla, 2012). Their model has been widely used by investors as this model offers a 
robust and reliable result. The model is also used by the Bursa Malaysia, the official stock 
exchange of Malaysia. Bursa Malaysia states that the main objective of the pricing model is 
to value the prices of the option fairly and bring better awareness to investors before they 
decide to buy or sell the option. Bursa Malaysia continues to stress that when a fair price of 
the option is made known to the public, a narrow spread between the Bid-Ask price can be 
created, thus enhancing market liquidity and avoiding a wide spread between the Bid-Ask 
price (http://www.bursamalaysia.com). 
Islamic Banking and Finance 2014 Conference. Paper ID 182 
 
7 
 
The designated formula for option valuation is as follows: 
 
C = S.N(d₁) – K e-rt .N(d₂)                      (1)      
d1=(ln(S/K)+ [r+ (σ2/2)]t)/(σ√t)                                                                                       (2) 
d₂= d₁-  σ √t                                                                                                                          (3) 
 
where, 
 
C= call value derived from BSOPM; S=daily closing price of the underlying; K= exercise 
price of the warrants; t=time to expiration (as % of year) for period of trading; r=risk free 
interest rate based on KLIBOR-3 month; e-rt = exponential function of r and t; N 
(.)=cumulative standard normal distribution function; ln (S/K) = natural logarithm of S/K; σ
= volatility of the underlying as measured by standard deviation; Annualized σ= daily 
volatility (σ) x √240. 
One of the main differences between options and warrants is, in the event of exercise of 
the warrants, there is increasing number of shares outstanding, thus dilution effect occurs. 
Thus, theoretical value derived from the BSOPM will be adjusted to integrate with the 
dilution effect following the warrants conversion (Dubofsky, 1992).  
 
Wᴀ = N/(N/ ϒ + M )C                                                                                                              (4) 
 
where, 
 
Wᴀ= theoretical value of warrants after dilution effect; C=call value computed using BSOPM; 
N=number of shares currently outstanding; M= number of warrants issued; ϒ= conversion 
ratio of 1:1 as determined by the Securities Commission of Malaysia. 
 
To determine the degree of mispricing in warrants, the following is applied: 
% Daily mispricing = (Wр - Wᴀ )/WA x 100                                                                             (5) 
where;   
Wр=actual closing market price of warrants; Wᴀ= theoretical price of warrants after dilution 
effect.  
 
% Average Daily Mispricing = ∑% Daily Mispricing/ Number of observations.              (6) 
 
 
 
4. Finding and Analysis  
 
4.1 Warrants Mispricing 
 
This study finds substantial mispricing in the 73 warrants traded within the period of 2006-
2012. This study supports Haron (2006) and Sukor and Obiyathulla (2010) that warrants 
market in Malaysia are not efficiently priced. The deviations in pricing between the 
theoretical values derived from BSOPM and the actual prices traded indicate pricing 
inefficiency in the Malaysian warrants market. The study finds that 30 out of the 73 warrants 
(41.10%) are overpriced during the period understudy. The average daily overpricing ranges 
from 5.45% to 132.18% with LABICAP-WA and OSKVI-WA recorded the highest and 
lowest overpricing by 132.18% and 5.45% respectively. On the other hand, 39 warrants 
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(53.42%) are underpriced with average daily underpricing ranges from 5.18% to 86.45%. 
LIONCOR-WB is the most underpriced warrants at average daily underpricing by 86.45%, 
followed by ASDION-WA by 72% with IJMLAND-WA with the least underpriced by 
5.18%. Although most of the warrants are found to be mispriced (underpriced or overpriced), 
four warrants (5.48%) recorded insignificant mispricing with the market prices being close to 
the BSOPM theoretical values. LATEXX-WA is found to be the most efficiently priced with 
only 0.10% deviation from its theoretical value, followed by SEG-WA (0.78%), TGOFFS-
WB (2.55%) and FAJAR-WA (4.63%). Thus, the study concludes that there are significant 
mispricing (underpricing or overpricing) recorded on Malaysian warrants during the period 
understudy (refer Appendix 1 for the descriptive statistics of warrants mispricing). 
 
4.2 The Issue of Gharar 
 
In relation to the permissibility of warrants contract, with regards to the issue of gharar, as 
discussed earlier, this issue receives differing arguments among Islamic jurists. The 
permissibility of warrants contract is generally denied by the majority of scholars on the basis 
that it involves gharar and is primarily transacted for speculative gains. A major factor that 
contributes to gharar is jahl (inadequate information) which increases uncertainty 
(Obaidullah, 1999). This is when the terms of exchange, such as, price, objects of exchange, 
time of settlement are not well-defined which implies a lack of transparency. Based on the 
Efficient Market Hypothesis, a market is said to be efficient with respect to an information set 
if the price ‘fully reflects’ that information set (Fama, 1970). Therefore, inadequate 
information and a lack of transparency indicate market inefficiency in disseminating 
information and this is reflected by the price deviations in warrants market detected in this 
study. Price deviations are the results of speculations due to inadequate information released 
to the market participants. Warrants, as an embedded option, are often used to speculate, not 
to protect the value of the underlying assets but to gain from the increase in value of the 
underlying asset.  
The ability of this instrument to speculate the future prices of the underlying asset due 
to random fluctuation in prices leads to random gains and losses which resemble maysir, a 
game of chance or gambling, thus is objected in Islam (Obaidullah, 2002). When speculation 
is used to transfer wealth from one party to another, it would amount to a zero-sum game, 
akin to gambling, which is strongly prohibited in Islam (El Diwany, 2003). Therefore, this 
study claimed that there is an element of excessive gharar in the event of substantial average 
daily mispricing in warrants market as a result of speculative activities due to the 
informational inefficient market.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The issue of the permissibility of the use of derivatives in Islamic Finance is still 
unresolved. The conventional derivatives manage risk by shifting or transferring the risk to 
those who, for a price, are willing to assume the risk. Notwithstanding, risk-shifting activities 
in derivative violate the basic principles of Shariah law, thus are not readily accepted by 
Shariah scholars as permissible financial instruments (Obaidullah, 2002). Some Islamic 
scholars do not find any standardization and harmonization in the ruling regarding this issue. 
In the attempt to shed some relevant light into this matter, this study investigated warrants 
pricing of 73 Malaysian equity warrants traded within the six year period by employing the 
BSOPM. There seems to be deviations of pricing where 94.52% (69 out of 73) of the 
warrants traded are mispriced in reference with their theoretical values. This mispricing of 
warrants indicated inefficiency in the Malaysian warrants market. Therefore, based on the 
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argument above and the extent of mispricing revealed in the analysis, this study found the 
element of gharar in warrants contract when viewed from the pricing inefficiency in the 
market. Mispricing of warrants in Malaysian market indicates speculative activities and 
speculation is not allowed in Islam. According to Obaidullah (1999), pp 16; 
 
“Any attempt to speculate in the hope of the theoretically infinite gains is, in all 
likelihood, a game of chance for such participants. While the gains, if they materialize, are in 
the nature of maysir or unearned gains, the possibility of equally massive losses do indicate a 
possibility of default by the loser and hence, gharar”. 
 
 Speculation may contain gharar (uncertainty) and maysir (gambling) which are all 
prohibited in Islam. Islam forbids these because they may result in wealth accumulation at the 
expense of other parties (Helliar and Alsahlawi, 2011). This activity violates the concept of 
adl (justice), does not serve the concept of maslahah (public interest) and does not follow the 
Maqasid al Shariah.  
 Findings from this study revealed that Islamic financial engineering is in dire need to 
come up with an instrument which is at par if not better than the existing conventional 
instrument for risk management that complies with the Shariah principles, does not violate 
the maqasid and can offer and accommodate risk management without allowing any 
speculations that may lead to wealth accumulation of one party only. An instrument which 
may be an adaptation of the concept of khiyar al-shart and is perhaps parallel with the 
concept of bai-al-urbun discussed earlier, not just replicating the existing conventional 
innovations and merely adapt it to the Islamic atmosphere. The principle of the prohibition of 
gharar is to ensure the fullest acceptance and satisfaction of the parties involved in risk 
management. This acceptance will only be achieved through certainty, full knowledge, full 
disclosure and transparency of information about the object of the contract. With the 
compliance of the principle of prohibition of gharar, the injustice and exploitation among the 
contracting parties can then be avoided. 
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Appendix: Descriptive Statistics of Warrants Mispricing 
 
No. Equity Warrants Average (%) Maximum (%) Minimum (%) 
1 LBICAP-WA 132.18 321.51 -14.69 
2 TRC-WA 120.19 215.02 45.18 
3 EAH-WA 107.21 271.46 29.51 
4 GPACKET-WA 99.73 475.76 6.67 
5 MPCORP-WB 94.51 376.23 10.06 
6 GRANFLO-WA 90.51 211.33 0.48 
7 HEXAGON-WA 78.27 695.93 -67.04 
8 HOVID-WA 75.11 670.78 -35.18 
9 FRONTKN-WA 43.90 120.86 -35.72 
10 JADI-WA 41.68 155.95 7.89 
11 PERDANA-WA 40.50 137.45 -20.40 
12 HUBLINE-WA 39.05 107.92 9.05 
13 GADANG-WA 33.01 99.40 -29.67 
14 MASTEEL-WA 26.20 49.33 6.47 
15 PJDEV-WC 24.99 69.68 -24.83 
16 NOTION-WA 24.58 99.25 -64.85 
17 REDTONE-WA 21.92 66.57 -12.84 
18 HWGB-WB 20.01 50.75 -19.93 
19 CENTURY-WB 19.57 49.25 -11.50 
20 TIGER-WA 12.96 73.77 -41.69 
21 KYM-WA 12.14 41.69 -19.25 
22 IRIS-WB 12.04 51.70 -30.92 
23 LBS-WA 11.94 86.64 -60.55 
24 YUNKONG-WA 11.34 43.63 -38.10 
25 IRCB-WA 10.87 34.25 -21.46 
26 HUNZPTY-WB 6.86 45.65 -25.49 
27 UNISEM-WA 6.43 84.18 -32.17 
28 SALCON-WA 5.74 67.15 -46.49 
29 IJMPLNT-WA 5.57 44.82 -16.33 
30 OSKVI-WA 5.45 60.38 -42.72 
31 FAJAR-WA 4.63 24.60 -43.96 
32 TGOFFS-WB 2.55 92.13 -50.13 
33 SEG-WA 0.78 25.95 -17.12 
34 LATEXX-WA 0.10 55.99 -29.09 
35 IJMLAND-WA -5.18 41.40 -35.33 
36 KPJ-WA -6.15 48.32 -20.91 
37 DIGISTA-WA -7.31 38.61 -51.21 
38 GAMUDA-WD -7.55 15.95 -31.53 
39 MLAB-WA -8.92 43.41 -34.75 
40 PANTECH-WA -9.10 23.76 -38.12 
41 WCT-WB -11.81 80.13 -49.86 
42 ASIAEP-WB -17.75 11.74 -44.49 
43 HEVEA-WB -20.21 6.63 -41.10 
44 BORNOIL-WB -20.97 16.75 -62.32 
45 HARVEST-WA -22.68 26.89 -58.25 
46 MEDIA-WB -23.50 21.10 -40.07 
47 IJM-WC -23.78 1.66 -43.66 
48 SPSETIA-WB -24.70 7.79 -55.25 
49 CRESNDO-WA -25.13 1.44 -67.99 
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50 YTLPOWR-WB -25.41 -12.63 -49.95 
51 RAPID-WA -27.22 27.76 -53.13 
52 FFHB-WB -28.04 27.79 -80.11 
53 DIJACOR-WA -28.05 20.49 -43.17 
54 BIOSIS-WA -30.06 1.43 -52.58 
55 PA-WA -32.01 39.31 -69.89 
56 GUNUNG-WB -33.90 -2.03 -54.93 
57 DPS-WA -34.12 40.32 -74.69 
58 HLSCORP-WA -35.34 200.18 -87.40 
59 MTOUCHE-WB -36.57 15.26 -64.66 
60 ZECON-WA -38.28 10.50 -88.13 
61 BTM-WA -39.12 32.55 -58.13 
62 BJASSET-WA -39.96 11.32 -69.14 
63 ENGTEX-WA -41.68 7.71 -64.50 
64 FCW-WB -43.31 6.89 -75.58 
65 GBH-WA -48.77 -20.15 -68.90 
66 WWTKH-WB -55.97 16.12 -89.51 
67 MTOUCHE-WA -57.83 86.85 -84.23 
68 FUTUTEC-WA -62.61 37.23 -78.27 
69 RALCO-WB -62.90 -49.64 -80.70 
70 WAHSEONG-WA -65.58 -46.53 -78.74 
71 FIAMMA-WB -68.82 -57.12 -84.67 
72 ASDION-WA -72.00 -29.76 -84.32 
73 LIONCOR-WB -86.45 -46.59 -91.48 
 
